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SESSION 2 - I
INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2015: 
STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT LAWS
Brenda Swick, Dickinson Wright (Toronto) 
Hans-Joachim Priess, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Berlin) 
Christopher Yukins, The George Washington University Law School1
I. INTRODUCTION
This past year saw major structural changes to international procurement rules -- including im-
portant shifts in Canada’s laws, European procurement regulations which favor open, multilateral 
negotiations, and new, more liberal procurement policies at the World Bank -- all of which are likely 
to help open procurement markets around the world. 
II. CANADA UNDERTAKES IMPORTANT REFORMS
A. Transpacific Partnership Agreement -- Canada’s Procurement Offer
On November 5, 2015, the legal text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement was released 
to the public; it is available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/tpp-ptp/final_agreement-accord_finale.aspx?lang=eng. The TPP is an ambitious trade agree-
ment between Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam. It has a procurement-related chapter, Chapter 15. The 
TPP must still be ratified by the Parliament of Canada and implemented into Canadian law before 
it will become effective in Canada.
The Canadian federal and sub-federal procurement market is valued at over C$150 million per 
year. The TPP will subject the procurements of sub-federal governments, which have been tradition-
ally exempt from international procurement treaties, to its disciplines. 
The TPP Procurement Chapter is based on the disciplines in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Government Procurement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm. 
This will hopefully help to open procurement in markets that have traditionally been difficult to enter, 
including Australia, Malaysia and Vietnam.
1. Procurement Disciplines
Signatories to the TPP have committed to the core disciplines of national treatment and non-
discrimination. The TPP guarantees procedural fairness for suppliers by requiring non-discrimination, 
transparency, impartiality and accountability in the procurement process. Commitments include 
provisions to publish relevant information in a timely manner, to allow suppliers to obtain the tender 
documentation in a timely manner, to treat tenders fairly and impartially, and to maintain confidential-
ity of tenders. In addition, the Parties agree to use fair and objective technical specifications, to award 
contracts based solely on the evaluation criteria specified in the tender documentation (without resort 
to hidden criteria), and to establish due process procedures to question or review complaints about 
an award, including the provision for debriefings and the establishment of a bid review mechanism. 
2. NAFTA Implications
The United States, Canada, and Mexico have agreed to harmonize the tendering provisions of Chap-
ter 10 of NAFTA with the TPP procurement discipline. See Letter from Canada to the United States 
Reprinted from West Government ContraCts Year In revIeW CoverInG 2015 ConferenCe BrIefs, with 
permission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2016. Further use without the permission of West is 
prohibited. For further information about this publication, please visit west.thomson.com/store, or 
call 800.328.9352.
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at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/15-L-01.aspx?lang=eng and Letter from Canada 
to the United States and Mexico at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/15-L-02.
aspx?lang=eng. This includes a standardization of the monetary thresholds 
that will apply to procurement activities covered by NAFTA. This will reduce 
the administrative burden on the governments by removing a multiplicity 
of thresholds.
3. Anti-Corruption Measures
Article 15.8 commits each Party to maintain measures to address cor-
ruption in its government procurement regime. It provides: 
Each Party shall ensure that criminal or administrative 
measures exist to address corruption in its government 
procurement. These measures may include procedures to render 
ineligible for participation in the Party’s procurements, either 
indefinitely or for a stated period of time, suppliers that the 
Party has determined to have engaged in fraudulent or other 
illegal actions in relation to government procurement in the 
Party’s territory. Each Party shall also ensure that it has in 
place policies and procedures to eliminate to the extent possible 
or manage any potential conflict of interest on the part of those 
engaged in or having influence over a procurement.
As part of Canada’s commitment under Article 15.8, on July 3, 2015, 
the Government of Canada implemented a new federal government-wide 
Integrity Regime for procurement of goods and services, http://www.
tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/synopsis-backgrounder-eng.html, and real property 
transactions to help foster ethical business practices, ensure due process 
and uphold the public trust. This new regime is discussed below.
B. Government of Canada’s Integrity Regime
On July 3, 2015, Canada implemented a new government-wide 
“Integrity Regime” for procurement and real property transactions. 
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/ci-if-eng.html. The Integrity Regime 
replaces the previous Integrity Framework implemented in 2012. Sig-
nificant changes include the elimination of automatic debarment for 
the conduct of an “affiliate,” and the reduction of the debarment period 
from ten years to five years where suppliers can demonstrate that they 
have cooperated with law enforcement or undertaken remedial actions. 
The new Integrity Regime is implemented through Policy Notification 
107R1, available at https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-and-guidelines/policy-
notifications/PN-107R1. 
The Integrity Regime will be administered by Public Works and 
Government Services Canada (PWGSC) on behalf of the Government of 
Canada and will be governed by Memoranda of Understanding between 
PWGSC and other departments and agencies. PWGSC currently has 
Memoranda of Understanding with 25 federal government departments, 
agencies, tribunals and commissions.
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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1. Conduct Which Will Debar a Supplier
Under the new Integrity Regime, a supplier is ineligible to do business 
with the Government if it, or any members of its board of directors, have 
been convicted or discharged (either absolutely or conditionally) in the 
last three (3) years of any of the following offences under Canadian law 
or a “similar foreign offence”:
• payment of a contingency fee to a person to whom the Lobbying 
Act applies; 
• corruption, collusion, bid-rigging or any other anti-competitive 
activity under the Competition Act; 
• money laundering; 
• participation in activities of criminal organizations; 
• income and excise tax evasion; 
• bribing a foreign public official; 
• offences in relation to drug trafficking; 
• extortion; 
• bribery of judicial officers; 
• bribery of officers; 
• secret commissions; 
• criminal breach of contracts; 
• fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange transactions; 
• prohibited insider trading; 
• forgery and other offences resembling forgery; and 
• falsification of books and documents.
All suppliers are required to sign a certification when submitting 
their bids that the company, its directors, and its affiliates have not been 
charged, convicted, or absolutely/conditionally discharged of the above of-
fences or similar foreign offences in the past three years. The provision of 
a false or misleading certifications is, in and of itself, cause for debarment.
The Government does maintain an Ineligibility List which contains 
the names of companies that were determined ineligible by Public Works 
and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), available at http://www.
tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/four-inel-eng.html.
2. Length of Debarment
The debarment period is 10 years from the date of determination. 
However, if a debarred supplier addresses the cause of the offense or 
cooperates with Government authorities fully, it can obtain a reduction 
of the debarment period. The length of the debarment may be reduced by 
up to five years, but will also require an administrative agreement which 
allows the government to monitor the supplier’s ongoing behavior.
The debarment period runs in perpetuity for those suppliers that are 
convicted of committing frauds against the Government under either the 
NOTES
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Criminal Code or the Financial Administration Act. All such suppliers will 
be permanently debarred until a record suspension is obtained. Unlike a 
regular debarred supplier, no public interest exception or administrative 
agreement is possible for a company subject to permanent debarment.
3. Suspension 
The Government of Canada has the option to suspend a supplier for 
up to 18 months immediately upon that supplier being charged with or 
admitting guilt to any of the above listed offences, per the Ineligibility 
and Suspension Policy (available at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/
politique-policy-eng.html). There is no requirement that the supplier or 
one of its affiliates actually be convicted of the offence in question and, at 
this stage, there does not appear to be any sort of compensation mechanism 
if the supplier is ultimately vindicated. The Regime does not explicitly 
extend this suspension provision to violations by affiliates of the supplier, 
yet the Regime also requires suppliers to certify that neither they nor any 
affiliates have been charged with a listed offence or foreign equivalent.
The changes also allow for suppliers that have been charged to request 
an immediately determination of their debarment status. While this may 
result in immediate debarment, this will at least “start the clock” on the 
debarment period. Otherwise, such companies may be subject to a full 
18-month suspension pending charges and investigation, and only then 
begin a 5-10 year debarment at that point.
4. Termination of Existing Contracts
If a supplier is convicted of a listed offense, the Government of Canada 
is entitled to terminate the contract. Three key issues exist in regards to 
the termination provision. First, it only applies in situations where there 
is a conviction, and not simply a charge. Second, termination is permis-
sive but not mandatory – the Government allows suppliers to submit 
argument as to why the contract should not be terminated. Third, if the 
Government chooses not to terminate the contract, it must put in place an 
administrative agreement for the contract. The agreement must include 
provisions for third party monitoring of the contract.
5. Administrative Agreements
As indicated above, there are certain circumstances where the Gov-
ernment mandates an administrative agreement be put in place with a 
supplier. (The administrative agreements can be found at http://www.
tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/ententes-agreements-eng.html.) These agreements 
are meant to cover situations which require caution and additional moni-
toring. Agreements will generally be conditional and require suppliers to 
engage in remedial action and take further compliance measures.
There are four instances where such administrative agreements are 
mandatory:
• an ineligible supplier has had its ineligibility period reduced; 
• in lieu of suspending a supplier; 
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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• a public interest exception was invoked with a ineligible sup-
plier; or 
• a decision is made to continue with an existing contract with 
a supplier which has become non-compliant with the regime.
These agreements must have provisions for monitoring by qualified 
independent third parties paid for and retained by the supplier. 
SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. is currently the only company which is regis-
tered as having an administrative agreement allowing them to continue 
to do with the Government of Canada pursuant to the Integrity Regime.
6. Affiliate Conduct 
Under the new regime, suppliers will no longer be debarred because 
an affiliate violated one of the listed offences. Instead, the Integrity 
Regime requires that the affiliate be assessed by an independent third 
party retained by the supplier to determine whether the supplier had any 
participation of involvement in the underlying offence. If the supplier can 
show that they had no such involvement, they will not be debarred.
This is a major change from the previous Integrity Framework – where 
a supplier would be debarred for 10 years for actions by an affiliate over 
which the supplier had no control and for conduct in which the supplier 
had no participation. 
7. Subcontractors
The new Integrity Regime is also binding on the subcontractors of 
any supplier. See Application of the Integrity Regime to Subcontractors, 
available at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/bulletins/ari-air-eng.html. 
Suppliers are required to refrain from entering into a subcontract with 
a debarred entity. Knowingly entering into such a subcontract will debar 
the supplier for five years. This is likely to be assessed on the basis of 
strict liability, and as such all contractors should implement due diligence 
procedures specifically directed at the compliance of any potential sub-
contractor with the Integrity Regime.
8. Public Interest Exception
The Government of Canada has the discretion to issue a Public Inter-
est Exception. Factors that will influence the granting of such an excep-
tion include: where no other supplier can perform the contract, there are 
emergent circumstances or national security concerns, or potential exists 
for material injury to the financial interests of the Government if the 
exception is not granted. See Public Interest Exceptions Guidelines, avail-
able at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/bulletins/exceptions-eng.html. 
C. Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement
On September 26, 2014, Canada and the European Commission 
signed the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA). Canada’s offer under CETA included deep and far-
NOTES
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reaching procurement commitments by the provinces and MASH sector 
(municipalities, academic, school boards and hospitals) and utilities in 
Canada. CETA has not been implemented into Canadian law, http://www.
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fta-
ale.aspx?lang=eng, and it is likely that full implementation will take a 
significant amount of time.
III. NEW EUROPEAN PROCUREMENT RULES
In April 2014 the legislative package modernizing EU public pro-
curement law (including Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, 
Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors and the Directive 2014/23/
EU on the award of concession contracts (together the EU Procurement 
Directives)) entered into force. See generally An American Perspective on the 
New European Public Procurement Directives, 2015 Gov’t Contracts Year 
in Review Briefs 3. Member states have to transpose relevant directives 
into national law by (at the latest) April 18, 2016 – some member states, 
e.g. the UK and Hungary, have already done so. E.g., United Kingdom, 
The Public Contracts Regulation 2015, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2015/102/pdfs/uksi_20150102_en.pdf. Other member states are still 
in the process of finalizing the implementing legislation. In Germany, for 
example, a part of the new legislation, i.e., the revised Act Against Re-
straints of Competition (GWB 2016) has already been adopted on 17th 
December 2015 by the German legislature. Other parts are still in the 
process of being finalized.
The EU Procurement Directives mainly aim to make the rules simpler 
and more efficient for public purchasers and companies and furthermore 
to provide the best value for money for public purchases while respecting 
the principles of transparency and competition. The key changes to exist-
ing EU public procurement law are summarized below. 
A. Strategic Objectives in the New Laws
According to the new legal framework, contracting authorities are al-
lowed to make greater use of public procurement in order to support stra-
tegic objectives, including in particular social and environmental aspects. 
See, e.g., UK Crown Commercial Service, A Brief Guide to the EU Public 
Contracts Directive (2014), at 5 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472985/A_Brief_Guide_to_
the_EU_Public_Contract_Directive_2014_-_Oct_2015__1_.pdf. 
In Germany, for example, Section 97 (3) GWB 2016 states as one of 
the principles that social and environmental aspects may be taken into 
account when awarding contracts. In addition the possibility to use en-
vironmental and social aspects as award criteria has been extended (see 
Section 127 GWB 2016). 
B. Changes to Procurement Procedures
The EU legislators also amended the rules on different procurement 
procedures to be more efficient, more simple and more flexible. Unlike the 
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
  Int'l-2-7
existing rules, according to Article 26 (2) of the Directive 2014/24/EU, con-
tracting authorities have a free choice between open procedures – under 
which any interested economic operator may submit a bid in response to 
a call for competition – and restricted procedures – under which a selec-
tion is made of those who respond to the advertisement and only they are 
invited to submit a tender for the contract. 
According to the EU Procurement Directives, contracting authorities 
are also given more freedom to negotiate. For example, constraints on 
using the competitive procedure with negotiation have been relaxed. Art. 
26(4) Directive 2014/24/EU defines additional and – unlike the existing 
rules – more flexible situations that justify the application of a competi-
tive procedure with negotiation. Moreover, the scope of application of the 
competitive dialogue procedure has been broadened. See, e.g., Michael 
Burnett, The New Rules for Competitive Dialogue and the Competitive 
Procedure with Negotiation in Directive 2014/24-What Might They Mean 
for PPP?, 10 Pub. Proc. Pub. Priv. Part. L. Rev. 62 (2015). According to Art. 
26 (4) Directive 2014/24/EU member states now have the obligation to 
ensure that contracting authorities can apply a competitive dialogue in 
the stated situations. 
Furthermore, a new procurement procedure, the innovation partner-
ship procedure, was introduced in Article 31 Directive 2014/24/EU, intend-
ing to allow scope for more innovative ideas. See, e.g., Marta Andrecka, 
Innovation Partnership in the New Public Procurement Regime - A Shift 
of Focus from Procedural to Contractual Issues?, 2015 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 
48; Pedro Cerqueira Gomes, The Innovative Innovation Partnerships Un-
der the 2014 Public Procurement Directive, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 211. 
This specific procedure aims to allow contracting authorities to establish 
a long-term innovation partnership for the development and subsequent 
purchase of a new, innovative product, service or works without the need 
for a separate procurement procedure for the purchase.
C. Electronic Procurement 
In order to simplify procurement procedures and increase their ef-
ficiency, the EU Procurement Directives regulate that in principle elec-
tronic communication will become mandatory. See generally European 
Commission, E-Procurement, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/
public-procurement/e-procurement/index_en.htm. The respective imple-
menting deadline is October 18, 2018 for public contracts, and April 18, 
2017 for central purchasing bodies. 
D. Cross-Border Joint Procurement 
According to the new EU Procurement Directives, contracting authori-
ties from one member state may acquire services from a central purchas-
ing body in another country. See, e.g., Piotr Bogdanowicz, Cross-Border 
Interest and Concession Contracts: A Critical Approach, 10 Eur. Pub. Proc. 
Pub. Priv. Part. L. Rev. 83 (2015).
Furthermore, Article 39 (4) Directive 2014/24/EU states that several 
contracting authorities from different member states may also jointly 
NOTES
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award a public contract. Unless the necessary elements have been regu-
lated by an international agreement concluded by the members states 
concerned, the participating contracting authorities shall conclude an 
agreement that also determines the relevant applicable national provi-
sions.
In addition, several contracting authorities from different member 
states may also set up a joint entity in order to jointly award a public 
contract. Article 39 (5) Directive 2014/24/EU. In this case the participating 
contracting authorities shall, by a decision of the competent body of the 
joint entity, agree on the applicable national procurement rules of either 
the Member State where the joint entity has its registered office or where 
the joint entity is carrying out its activities. 
E. Selection Criteria
As part of the reform, the provisions on selection criteria were amended. 
The exclusion grounds for various forms of misconduct have been extended 
and the concept of self-cleaning has been introduced as a defense to exclu-
sion. See generally Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (Hermann 
Pünder, Hans-Joachim Priess, and Sue Arrowsmith, eds., Carl Heymanns 
2009). In addition, contracting authorities are generally required to accept 
a self-declaration (called the European Single Procurement Document) as 
a means of proof and certificates, extracts from official registers, etc. may 
only be submitted by the winning bidder. 
F. Contract Management
Finally, provisions concerning modifications of contracts during their 
term and concerning termination of contracts have been included in the 
EU Procurement Directives. 
IV. THE WORLD BANK’S PROCUREMENT REFORMS
The World Bank is finalizing reforms of its procurement policies for 
borrowers. See, e.g., John Altenburg, Jr. & Aaron Ralph, Feature Comment: 
The New World Bank Procurement Framework, 57 Gov. Cont. ¶ 234 (Aug. 
5, 2015). Historically, the World Bank’s procurement guidelines, avail-
able at http://go.worldbank.org/1KKD1KNT40, had established baseline 
requirements which borrower nations had to meet to qualify for World 
Bank financing. See, e.g., Whitney Debevoise & Christopher Yukins, Feature 
Comment: Assessing the World Bank’s Proposed Revision of Its Procure-
ment Guidelines, 52 GC ¶ 180 (May 26, 2010). Those requirements were 
often considered overly restrictive, and there was an abiding concern that 
the World Bank’s procurement requirements were, ironically, themselves 
constraining development.
The World Bank responded to these criticisms by drafting new procure-
ment policies that leave borrower nations with far greater discretion, and 
far less World Bank oversight. The Bank launched a broad consultation 
process in 2013, which led to a proposed new framework for Bank-financed 
procurement which was published in October 2013. http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Resources/ProcurementProposedNew-
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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FrameworkOctober2013Final.pdf. The proposed framework reflected 
comments from stakeholders, who urged the Bank to:
• Allow for more innovative procurement methods, best suited 
to the needs of the project.
• Permit borrowers to use their own procurement rules and proce-
dures (“country systems”), “with due caution and management 
of risk,” in important part so that borrowers can develop their 
own internal procurement capacities.
• Emphasize capacity-building, especially in lower-income coun-
tries.
• Put more focus on quality and performance during contract 
administration.
• Be open to other means of improved governance and integrity, 
“including transparency, access to information, monitoring by 
civil society, internal controls, . . . more effective audits, and 
dispute resolution.”
•  Focus anew on fraud and corruption, including collusion, 
throughout the procurement cycle.
• Emphasize a “global context” for public procurement, with an 
eye to harmonization, international standards, assessments 
of nations’ capacity, procurement reform, and public sector 
management.
World Bank, Procurement Policy Review: Feedback from Consultations 
with External Stakeholders -- Executive Summary, http://consultations.
worldbank.org/consultation/procurement-policy-review-consultations. The 
new policy framework was initially endorsed by the Bank’s Executive Di-
rectors (the representatives of the major shareholder nations) in November 
2013. http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/procurement-policy-
review-consultations. 
On July 21, 2015, after further consultations and review, the Bank’s 
Executive Directors approved the new “Procurement Framework,” which is 
to go into effect in 2016 after World Bank management completes a readi-
ness review. Under the new framework, the Bank will finalize and issue 
the new Procurement Directive, Procedure and Regulations, to replace the 
current Procurement Operational Policy (OP 11.00), Procurement Bank 
Policy (BP 11.00), and -- perhaps most importantly -- the Bank’s Procure-
ment Guidelines, which have helped guide procurement in developing 
nations for many decades. As the Bank described the new framework:
Value for money, sustainable development and integrity are 
the vision of the new approach. It will help clients get better 
development results as it gives the World Bank the space and 
capacity to significantly increase its support to help countries 
develop their own procurement systems. For the first time, 
the World Bank will allow any contract award decisions to be 
based on criteria other than lowest price, including quality and 
sustainability.
NOTES
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http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/procurement-policy-
review-consultations.
Because of the prominent role that the World Bank plays in develop-
ing nations’ procurement markets, the World Bank’s reforms are likely to 
have a profound impact. There are several key aspects worth emphasizing:
Risk-Based Management: Under the new approach, the Bank will 
scrutinize fewer projects more heavily, depending on size and perceived 
project risk. See World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Proj-
ect Financing -- Phase II: The New Procurement Framework 2 (June 11, 
2015). The Bank’s goal is to conserve its resources, and to focus its limited 
oversight on the largest projects. Because contractors’ risks are not always 
proportionate to project size -- corruption risks, for example, may even 
be inversely proportional to project size, as smaller projects may attract 
more petty corruption -- contractors working in these markets may need 
to redraw their risk assessments, cognizant that the Bank’s oversight over 
small- and mid-sized Bank-financed projects may well recede.
Best Value and Competitive Dialogue: The new approach moves 
decisively away from the Bank’s traditional emphasis on low-price awards 
using (in U.S. parlance) sealed bidding. The Bank’s new approach makes 
it clear that borrowers (governments) using Bank financing will be able 
to rely on other, more liberal methods, such as (in U.S. terms) competitive 
negotiations (often called “competitive dialogues” internationally, and in 
the Bank’s policy documents), in order to identify best value (or “value 
for money,” as it is sometimes known). This has profound importance for 
exporters from the United States and the European Union, who typically 
offer high-technology, high-price, high-value equipment and services, and 
will almost invariably fail in low-price competitions. In their discussions 
with public acquisition planners, these firms may point out that at the 
Bank, as elsewhere (see above, regarding the new European Union pro-
curement rules), there is growing consensus that procurements should 
rely more on competitive multilateral negotiations, and far less on low-
price sealed bidding.
Bid Complaints and Fraud: Under the new framework, the Bank 
has promised a new, more transparent system for addressing complaints 
from prospective contractors. See Phase II -- The New Procurement Frame-
work, supra, at 2. The Bank’s published documents, however, have not 
fully defined how that complaints process is to be structured, perhaps 
because the Bank remains chary of becoming a recognized forum for 
formalized bid challenges involving Bank-financed projects. Contractors 
should remain vigilant, as the Bank defines the new complaints process 
in the near future. Contractors should also recognize that the Bank, and 
its sanctions system, are likely to shift attention and resources to fraud 
in contract administration. Many observers have long argued that the 
Bank has done a poor job of policing fraud in the projects it finances. 
The Bank therefore is likely to develop strategies to enhance its abil-
ity, and the ability of its borrowers, to combat fraud in Bank-financed 
projects. See id. at 4.
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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Country Systems and Capacity Development: Historically, devel-
oping nations using Bank financing could be required to use two sets of 
procurement rules: their own “country systems,” and, on Bank-financed 
projects, a separate set of rules written to be consistent with the Bank’s 
Procurement Guidelines. This was inefficient, and slowed development 
of borrower nations’ own procurement regimes. The new World Bank 
procurement framework will allow some purchasing agencies in some 
borrower nations to use their own procurement rules (termed “Alternative 
Procurement Arrangements”) for Bank-financed procurement, but only 
if those agencies can meet certain benchmarks. See World Bank, Draft 
Guidance: Methodology to Assess Alternative Procurement Arrangements 
in Borrower Implementing Agencies for Procurements Financed Under 
IPF (2015). The benchmarks remain somewhat fluid -- the Bank may, 
for example, be more liberal in allowing the use of country systems if a 
borrower nation has joined the World Trade Organization’s Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA). See id. at 41. Finally, and importantly, 
because the Bank recognizes that many country procurement systems 
may still be developing, the Bank has committed to much broader efforts 
on capacity-building in procurement. See generally Christopher Yukins 
& James Ruairi Macdonald, Capacity Building in Public Procurement: 
Burma/Myanmar -- A Case Study, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 749 (2015). 
V. ANTI-CORRUPTION DEVELOPMENTS
As the discussion above reflects, procurement systems around the 
world are incorporating very common anti-corruption systems, and that 
pattern only deepened in 2015. This harmonized approach is driven, in 
part, by trade agreements, which are an increasingly important source of 
harmonization and consistency.
Compliance Systems: The basic requirements for compliance systems, 
for example, are now largely uniform in both industrialized and developing 
nations. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(Nov. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa-guidance. As noted, 
Article 57 of the new European procurement 2014/24/EU recognized that 
compliance and remedial efforts (“self-cleaning,” in European terms) play 
an important role for contractors, tainted by corruption, that want to engage 
again in public procurement markets. The European nations implementing 
the directives in their own laws (see above) are now giving more definition 
to what, exactly, those compliance efforts are to entail. 
Bid Challenges: Driven in part by international trade agreements 
calling for effective bid challenge (in the United States, “bid protest”) sys-
tems, nations around the world are erecting reliable challenge systems. 
Contractors working in international procurement markets can therefore 
generally (though not always) assume that a foreign government will have 
a bid challenge mechanism in place. Having that remedy available can 
shape contractors’ strategies during the procurement planning phase (ven-
dors can challenge unreasonably restrictive requirements, for example), 
and serves as an important safety-valve, should corruption emerge during 
the formation process itself.
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Suspension/Debarment: As the Canadian developments (see above) 
demonstrate, suspension and debarment have fast become important, and 
standard, elements of procurement systems around the world. There is 
not yet consensus on what those systems should look like -- the European 
Union procurement directive Article 57, for example, leaves exclusion to 
the individual contracting entity, while other systems (such as the World 
Bank) contemplate a centralized, adjudicative process, see, e.g., William 
A. Roberts, III, Tracye Winfrey Howard, Samantha S. Lee, Two Systems, 
Two Types of Risk: How the World Bank Sanctions Regime Differs from 
U.S. Suspension and Debarment, Proc. Law. 6 (ABA Fall 2015) -- but there 
is at least agreement that suspension and debarment are vital tools in 
the fight against corruption. In fact (as was discussed above), perhaps 
for the first time, debarment emerged as an explicit, endorsed tool in an 
international trade agreement, when the text of the proposed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership was released publicly in late 2015. 
Fraud: With regard to fraud, however, there is much less consensus. 
The U.S. experience under the False Claims Act suggests that a success-
ful anti-fraud regime depends on at least three critical elements: severe 
penalties (which have an important in terrorem effect in the contractor 
community), whistleblower incentives (and perhaps protections), and a 
loosened scienter standard (because of the difficulties of proving actual 
intent to defraud, given the many variables in a normal public procure-
ment). While some of those elements are in place in other systems, this 
area -- how to handle fraud in contract performance -- is likely to be an 
area of rapid development in the coming years.
VI. CONCLUSION
This past year saw important developments in procurement systems 
around the world, in from the World Bank to the European Union, to 
Canada and the Pacific. These developments reflect emerging common 
norms, practices and rules systems, as procurement structures slowly 
bend to reflect one another across borders. Because differences in rules 
systems pose such an important barrier to international trade in procure-
ment, as those differences erode, procurement markets are likely to grow 
ever more truly “global” in the coming years.
1 Part II of this article, on Canadian developments, was prepared by Ms. Swick, 
and Part III, on European developments, was authored by Mr. Priess and 
the procurement law team at Freshfields, with citations to Internet and 
related resources prepared by Professor Yukins, the author of the balance 
of this article.
